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The first edition of Peter Lipton's Inference to the Best Explanation, which appeared 
in 1991, is a modern classic in the philosophy of science. Yet in the second edition of 
the book, Lipton proves that even a classic can be improved. Not only does Lipton 
elaborate and expand on the themes covered in the first edition, but he also adds a 
new chapter on Bayesianism. In particular, he attempts a reconciliation between the 
Bayesian approach and that offered by Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). 
IBE recently has been championed as a distinctive kind of inductive inference, 
broadly understood, which has the dual attributes of doing justice to the actual 
workings of science and the demands for its rational justification. In other words, it is 
supposed to be both an accurate description of the inferential processes of actual 
science and also endowed with the property of conferring epistemic warrant to the 
conclusions reached by means of it. As such, exploring its merits on both counts is of 
great importance for contemporary philosophy of science. While Lipton touches on 
justificatory issues, his primary focus is the descriptive merits of Bayesianism and 
IBE, a subject that the author argues has been rather neglected. As its name indicates, 
IBE is concerned with the notions of inference and explanation, which are introduced 
in the first three chapters of the book. On the inference side, Lipton reviews various 
accounts of inductive inference and notes their shortcomings, which IBE hopes to 
overcome. On the explanation front, he argues that the absence of a satisfactory 
theory of explanation need not preclude us from analyzing IBE philosophically. 
Despite his scepticism about existing philosophical frameworks for explanation, he 
does argue throughout chapter 3 that a version of the causal model of explanation best 
supplements the general inferential pattern of IBE. This favoured version is that of 
contrastive explanation. These explanations are unique in that they do not attempt to 
answer the question 'Why this?' but the question 'Why this rather than that?' (p. 33). 
In other words, they do not employ causal talk to explain an event simpliciter, but 
rather an event together with the absence of another event, similar in kind. 
Lipton's presentation of these introductory themes is rich, well informed and 
competent. Yet given the small number of pages, and the volume of material that 
Lipton addresses, it is quite demanding. 
In chapter 4, Lipton embarks on a more systematic treatment of IBE. In particular, he 
characterizes IBE as inference to the loveliest explanation, not inference to the 
likeliest explanation. In this way, Lipton attempts to avoid trivialising his model by 
assimilating it to those accounts that seek the most probable explanation. Instead, he 
takes the loveliest explanation to be the one that, if correct, provides the most 
understanding (p. 59). As he avoids this analysis in terms of probability, IBE, as 
Inference to the Loveliest Explanation, can stand as an independent account on its 
own right. Finally, after his extensive argument for the distinction between the 
loveliest and likeliest explanation, Lipton ultimately concludes that if IBE is a 
reasonable model for our inferential practices, loveliness and likeliness will tend to be 
coextensive (p. 61). This claim, though, is not at all obvious but rather seems to 
require an argument. However that may be, we argue below that a more serious 
problem for Lipton's project is that his argument actually undermines, instead of 
promoting, the independent authority of IBE, actually subjugating it to accounts that 
focus exclusively on likeliness, such as Bayesianism.
Although Lipton believes that IBE is a distinctive kind of inductive inference, he does 
not express imperialistic inclinations for it over other forms of inductive inference as 
Harman (1965) and Psillos (2002) do. Nonetheless, he still sets out to defend its 
normative status by discussing issues of justification in chapters 6 and 9-11. Along 
with the newly added Bayesian chapter, these chapters contain the most interesting 
arguments. Chapter 6 provides an insightful application of IBE to the raven paradox 
of confirmation. Lipton also argues that this solution has many benefits over the 
various standard solutions already in the literature. Briefly put, Lipton's point is that 
causal-explanatory considerations suffice to rule out confirmation of hypotheses from 
prima facie wildly irrelevant instances by bringing in relevant information about the 
causal properties of the latter (pp. 95-97). In another interesting application of IBE to 
an old problem, Lipton discusses the often made distinction between predication and 
accommodation. He argues that this distinction can be easily substantiated under his 
reading of IBE. The core of his solution consists in the hypothesis that in the case of 
accommodation, the best explanation of the theory's fit with the data may be that the 
scientist has actually fudged the theory's implications by essentially using the data to 
be explained (p. 170). 
Lipton also spends a significant amount of time defending the claim that IBE is a 
truth-conducive rule of inference against van Fraassen's (1989) challenge that our best 
scientific theories may not be good enough to track truth. Van Fraassen's charge is 
that not only does IBE not guarantee that our loveliest hypotheses are true but rather 
the converse most likely holds. Lipton's response is considerably forceful here, 
arguing that van Fraassen's charge is inconsistent. In his argument, Lipton makes use 
of the central role of background beliefs in the workings of IBE. In particular, he 
argues that if we assume, as van Fraassen does, that our ranking of the explanatory 
loveliness of theories is reliable, then it follows that our theories are approximately 
true. Consequently, van Fraassen's argument is inconsistent (pp. 157-159). 
Although this result has important consequences for the issue of scientific realism, 
Lipton postpones the explicit treatment of realism until the last chapter of the book. In 
this chapter, Lipton examines the merits of the most popular argument for scientific 
realism, the No-Miracles Argument (NMA). Briefly put, the NMA suggests that the 
approximate truth of our scientific theories is the best explanation of their empirical 
success; if this were not the case, their success would be a miracle. It has been argued 
(see, e.g., Boyd 1982 and Psillos 1999) that the NMA is an instance of the general 
inference pattern of IBE. However, since our scientific theories have been generated 
by means of first-order IBEs, the NMA is only a second order IBE. This has given 
rise to the charge of circularity against the NMA. Lipton, unlike other recent 
defenders of IBE (cf. Psillos 1999), admits that the charge of circularity has some bite. 
For this reason, he focuses attention on the low-level IBEs and their relation to truth. 
The main themes of his arguments are the unificatory virtues of the realist thesis, 
which extend over both the observable and the unobservable domain, and the inability 
of alternatives, like constructive empiricism, to draw a principled line between these 
two realms (pp. 198-206).
Overall Lipton's discussion of these issues is clear, precise, and illuminating. Despite 
the limited space, he succeeds in offering a serious defence of the realist thesis, doing 
justice both to the subtleties of the issues at hand and the richness of the relevant 
literature. These arguments represent a substantial contribution to the field. 
The most ambitious, original but also controversial part of the book is Lipton's 
treatment of the relationship between Bayesianism and IBE in chapter 7. Here, he 
defends the general thesis that "Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation 
are broadly compatible" (p. 106), in that "Bayesian Conditionalisation . . . is run in 
part on explanationist tracks" (p. 107). The originality of this view lies in that, except 
for a few scattered remarks, nearly all systematic treatments of either Bayesianism or 
IBE have treated the two as mutually exclusive. In favour of Bayesianism, van 
Fraassen (1989) claimed that Bayesianism shows why IBE is incoherent. Similarly, 
Howson (2000) argued that IBE amounts to committing the 'base-rate fallacy,' and 
Salmon (2001) argued that only Bayesianism does not confuse the separate issues of 
explanation and confirmation. In favour of IBE, Okasha (2000) has highlighted the 
fact that IBE, unlike Bayesianism, throws light on the context of discovery, i.e. the 
actual workings of science, while independently of IBE there have been numerous 
complaints regarding the descriptive inadequacy of Bayesianism (cf. Chihara 1987, 
Earman 1992).
Lipton attempts to take a middle way in the debate. Although he also presses in favour 
of IBE, citing the descriptive inadequacies of Bayesianism, he nevertheless attempts 
to build a bridge between the two by exploiting the alleged overlap between the 
loveliest (IBE) and the likeliest explanation (suggested by Bayesianism). He 
constructs this bridge by citing four complementary aspects of the explanations 
offered by IBE and those offered by Bayesianism: 1) explanatory considerations may 
be viewed as supplying the actual values of both the prior probability of the 
hypothesis and the probabilities of the evidence to be inserted in Bayes' theorem, 2) 
very often IBE and Bayesian conditionalization yield the same results, in which case 
one can easily view IBE as a useful heuristic replacing abstract and cumbersome 
probabilistic reasoning, 3) explanatory considerations help determine the evidence 
one should conditionalize on and 4) IBE sheds light on the processes involved in the 
context of discovery. Hence, Lipton thinks that the Bayesian and the explanationist 
can be friends.
The nobility of Lipton's peace-making ambition notwithstanding, we are not 
convinced that his solution is viable. Our claim is that on his argument, IBE is 
relegated to a mere auxiliary device employed in service to the epistemically prior 
Bayesian theory. This point is clearly demonstrated when we consider what happens 
when Bayesianism and IBE give different answers to the same question, a possibility 
which follows naturally from the distinction between loveliness and likeliness. In that 
case one is confronted with the following options: (a) IBE is right, (b) or Bayesianism 
is right or (c) neither of the two is right. According to Lipton's claims for the 
autonomy of IBE, one would expect him to argue in favour of either (a) or (c). On the 
contrary, however, Lipton repeatedly asserts that Bayesianism gives the normatively 
correct answer and IBE merely reveals why ordinary judgements are mistaken, if they 
are mistaken (cf. pp. 107, 115, 117, 120). If indeed we do possess a normatively 
sound theoretical framework, i.e. Bayesianism, which allows us in principle to reach 
the correct answer, then how does IBE contribute to the analysis of our inductive 
practices? 
If Bayesianism does in fact provide the normatively correct answer in the face of 
conflict, then IBE is at best an auxiliary device that can only explain why we are often 
mistaken in our judgements. As Lipton's own Tversky-and-Kahneman-style examples 
reveal (e.g. Linda the bank teller[i] and the base-rate fallacy), IBE is more of an 
example to avoid when addressing the normative question, rather than a model to 
pursue. In other words, IBE is not a rule of inference complementary to the 
analytically prior Bayesian inference the way Lipton believes it to be. 
To be sure, Lipton is primarily concerned with the descriptive task, and from this 
perspective one might argue that IBE fares better than Bayesianism, since it appears 
to be a fact that people do not engage in abstract probabilistic reasoning in their 
everyday affairs, scientific or not. This brings us naturally to our second, more general, 
complaint. We think that Lipton puts too much weight on the descriptive project at the 
expense of the philosophically more crucial problem of justification. We take it that 
the primary task of a plausible philosophy of science is that it present us not simply 
with an adequate description of our inferential habits but rather with firm grounds for 
our beliefs these habits generate. Being too modest on this count, Lipton offers a 
rather weak justificatory case, which shows most clearly in his admission that 
Bayesianism sets the standards of correctness and IBE merely fills in the descriptive 
gaps. 
This critique is illustrated by considering Lipton's first attempt to reconcile 
Bayesianism and IBE, i.e. that explanatory considerations help us determine the 
probabilities to be inserted in Bayes' formula. As long as IBE does not offer the means 
to fix the probability assignments under consideration, no claims to objectivity can be 
adduced in its favour, except perhaps of the less important merit of descriptive 
accuracy as far as the actual determination of the priors and likelihoods is concerned 
(cf. Psillos 2004). Given the immense difficulties in justifying such descriptive 
constraints, only a strong normative case for IBE and against Bayesianism can aspire 
to avoid the result of IBE being just 'the second best'. Such an incompatibilist
approach, however, would of course openly violate Lipton's plea for the compatibility 
between the Bayesian and the explanationist rules of inference.
Despite our reservations regarding Lipton's reconciliation between the Bayesian and 
the explanationist, Inference to the Best Explanation ultimately offers the most 
complete presentation and defence of IBE to date and as such it is a 'must' read for 
anyone who wants a deeper understanding of inductive inference, broadly 
understood.[ii]
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